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Note 
 
Daubert Rises: The (Re)applicability of the 
Daubert Factors to the Scope of Forensics 
Testimony 
Geoffrey M. Pipoly* 
On May 6, 2004, Brandon Mayfield’s life was turned upside 
down. The thirty-eight-year-old attorney’s home was raided by 
federal agents, and Mayfield was arrested pursuant to an FBI 
investigation of the March 2004 Madrid train bombings which 
killed ninety-one civilians.1 The basis for the FBI’s interest in 
Mayfield was fingerprint evidence: Spanish police lifted prints 
from the scene of the bombing, which were then run through 
FBI and Interpol databases.2 The FBI told Mayfield that “his 
fingerprints matched those of the Madrid train bomber, and 
that he was the prime suspect in a crime punishable by death.”3 
Indeed, the FBI’s affidavit underlying Mayfield’s arrest claimed 
that Mayfield’s fingerprints were a “100% positive identifica-
tion” to the prints lifted from the scene of the bombing.4 How-
ever, the FBI’s theory had one critical flaw: Mayfield was inno-
cent. The fingerprint evidence on which the FBI relied was 
 
*  J.D. 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2005, University 
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phen Cribari for being a mentor and teacher, and without whom the Author 
would never have developed his (near-obsessive) interest in the topic. Thank 
you also to the hardworking staff and editors of Minnesota Law Review: work-
ing with you was a true pleasure. Additional thanks to Jason Steck, who was a 
great help in developing and narrowing the focus of this Note. The Author also 
extends his gratitude to his family and friends for their steadfast support dur-
ing law school and Law Review. Finally, thanks to Erin, whose support and 
encouragement helped the Author get through law school with his sanity in-
tact. Copyright © 2012 by Geoffrey M. Pipoly. 
 1. Garrett Epps, Vengeance Is Brandon Mayfield’s, SALON (Oct. 3, 2007, 
11:01 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/10/03/brandon_mayfield.  
 2. Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 503 (2010).  
 3. Id. at 967.  
 4. Id.  
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erroneous; Mayfield was not involved in the Madrid bombing.5 
Mayfield was quickly exonerated, and no criminal trial was ev-
er held. But if Mayfield’s case had gone to trial, what might his 
fate have been if an FBI analyst had testified with certainty 
that Mayfield’s fingerprints were a “100%” match?  
If Mayfield’s case had gone to trial, the admissibility of the 
forensics testimony against him would have been governed by 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which permits expert testimony 
based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”6 
The seminal United States Supreme Court case defining Rule 
702’s contours in federal court is Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,7 in which the Court held that scientific 
evidence must be both “relevant” and “reliable”8 to be admissi-
ble, and outlined a five-factor test to aid district courts in their 
reliability determinations.9 Daubert is clear that the “overarch-
ing subject” of a court’s inquiry should be the “scientific validi-
ty . . . of the principles that underlie” a proffered theory or 
technique.10 In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Court clari-
fied Daubert, explaining that although reliability was still the 
sine qua non of admissibility for expert testimony, the Daubert 
factors were not dispositive in every case.11 Kumho Tire held 
that judges may formulate reliability criteria on a case-by-case 
basis that relied “on the nature of the issue, the expert’s partic-
ular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.”12 
At admissibility hearings, federal district courts must as-
sess the reliability of forensics testimony for admissibility, ei-
ther by applying the Daubert factors or some other case-specific 
 
 5. See id. (“On May 20, 2004, news reports revealed that Spain had 
matched [Mayfield’s ostensible fingerprint] with a man named Ouhane Daoud, 
an Algerian citizen. Mayfield was released from prison the following day.”). 
 6. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 7. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 8. Id. at 589.  
 9. Id. at 592–94 (explaining that, in assessing the reliability of scientific 
evidence, courts should consider empirical testing (falsifiability) of the tech-
nique; peer review of the technique; known or potential error rate of the tech-
nique; existence and maintenance of standards controlling operation of the 
technique; and general acceptance of the technique in the field).  
 10. Id. at 594–95.  
 11. See 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (“[W]e can neither rule out, nor rule in, 
for all cases and for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned 
in Daubert, nor can we now do so for subsets of cases categorized by category 
of expert or by kind of evidence. Too much depends on the particular circum-
stances of the particular case at issue.”). 
 12. See id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Petitioners at 19, Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137 (No. 97-1709)).  
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reliability criteria suggested by Kumho Tire. At these hearings, 
forensics experts commonly testify that their methods are ei-
ther traditional “science” or “firmly rooted in the scientific 
method”13 without legitimate bases in science for those claims.14 
Despite the vast subjectivity their techniques entail,15 forensics 
practitioners often express their findings in “bold absolutes.”16 
For example, a firearm-and-toolmark analyst may testify that a 
bullet from a crime scene was fired by a suspect’s gun, “to the 
exclusion of all other firearms in the world,”17 or a fingerprint 
analyst may testify that the discipline of fingerprint analysis is 
more than ninety-nine percent accurate.18 Nonetheless, courts 
almost categorically admit forensics testimony without limita-
tion or nuance.19  
This Note presents a new framework for courts grappling 
with the treatment of forensics evidence and argues that the 
Daubert factors themselves hold the key to balancing courts’ 
need to admit forensics testimony against well-founded con-
cerns surrounding the scientific reliability and validity of fo-
rensic techniques. Part I provides an overview of the field of fo-
rensics, explains its deficiencies with regard to scientific 
 
 13. See, e.g., Ronald G. Nichols, Defending the Scientific Foundations of 
the Firearms and Tool Mark Identification Discipline: Responding to Recent 
Challenges, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 586, 586 (2007); see also United States v. Di-
az, No. CR 05-00167, 2007 WL 485967, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007) 
(“There is a method and science behind firearm-and-toolmark identification.”); 
United States v. Foster, 300 F. Supp. 2d 375, 376 (D. Md. 2004) (equating fin-
gerprinting analysis with “science”). 
 14. See Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims 
in Forensic Science: Still Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1187, 1204 n.64 
(2010) (“The notion that forensic individualization claims are extreme and 
fundamentally unscientific is neither a radical idea nor one that is original 
with us.”).  
 15. See Daniel L. Cork et al., Some Forensic Aspects of Ballistic Imaging, 
38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 481 (2010) (“[C]urrently, the interpretation of in-
dividualization/identification is subjective in nature . . . .”(internal citations 
omitted)); see also United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 571 (E.D. 
Pa. 2002) (discussing the amount of subjectivity inherent in expert fingerprint 
examiners’ testimony).  
 16. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BALLISTIC IMAGING 67 (Daniel L. Cork et 
al. eds., 2009).  
 17. Id.  
 18. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (reporting a fingerprint expert’s tes-
timony that his field had a “proficiency error rate of just under one percent.”).  
 19. See Elizabeth L. DeCoux, The Admission of Unreliable Expert Testi-
mony Offered by the Prosecution: What’s Wrong with Daubert and How to 
Make It Right, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 131, 132 (“[P]rosecutors fending off chal-
lenges to the reliability of their expert witnesses enjoy a success rate of ninety-
two percent in trial courts and ninety-eight percent in appellate courts.”). 
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notions of falsifiability and validity, and introduces the existing 
evidentiary framework under which forensics testimony is ad-
mitted. Part II explores courts’ rationale for admitting these 
techniques (and their scientific flaws), and critically distin-
guishes the admissibility of evidence from the scope of a wit-
ness’s testimony. Part II also suggests that forensics’ scientific 
deficiencies are insufficient to warrant such techniques’ whole-
sale exclusion, but are sufficient to warrant significant limits 
on the scope of forensics practitioners’ testimony once they take 
the witness stand at trial. Part III proposes a framework courts 
should use for limiting the scope of forensics practitioner’s tes-
timony: applying the Daubert factors (currently used only to de-
termine the admissibility of evidence) to the weight and scope 
of forensics testimony. Consequently, under the methodology 
this Note proposes, the scope of forensics practitioners’ testi-
mony would be limited to avoid existing problems permissible 
under the current framework.  
I.  FORENSICS AND FRAMEWORKS   
This Part introduces forensic techniques and the legal tests 
courts apply when considering their admissibility in litigation. 
Section A provides an overview of the goals of forensics as com-
pared to traditional science and shows why forensics fail to 
meet scientific standards of falsifiability and validity. Section B 
summarizes the legal framework though which forensics are 
analyzed in federal court. This Part also explains why, after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Kumho Tire, lawyers wrongly be-
lieved that scientific problems with forensics might have legal 
significance.  
A. FORENSICS “SCIENCE?” 
The term “forensics” refers not to a single unified disci-
pline, but is a broad term encompassing a diverse array of prac-
tices and techniques20 typically employed by the state to gener-
 
 20. Although many disciplines fall under the broad term “forensics,” some 
examples of forensic disciplines include general toxicology; firearms/toolmarks; 
controlled substances; impression evidence; blood-pattern analysis; crime sce-
ne investigation; and digital evidence. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 38 (2009); see also NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
STATUS AND NEEDS OF FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE PROVIDERS: A REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 2 (2006), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/213420.htm. 
Although this Note is concerned with the evidentiary framework for forensics 
generally, many of its examples will be of two fields in particular: fingerprint-
ing ( long considered the “gold standard” of forensic reliability), 1 DAVID L. 
 2012] DAUBERT & FORENSICS TESTIMONY 1585 
 
ate evidence to aid in the investigation and prosecution of 
crimes.21 Although many individual fields in the forensics uni-
verse claim a basis in science or roots in scientific principles,22 
the types of techniques employed by forensics practitioners de-
part from the methods and practices of traditional science in 
several meaningful ways.  
Traditional science is grounded in the scientific method, 
which begins with an empirical question about the world,23 fol-
lowed by theories that scientists propose to answer the ques-
tion, and hypotheses to test those theories.24 Empirical studies 
 
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY: STATISTICS & RESEARCH METHODS § 1:30 (2008–2009 
ed.), and firearm-and-toolmark analysis. 
 21. See 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE 
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY: FORENSICS § 29:3 (describing foren-
sics practitioners as the “hired help” of the state, and arguing that unlike oth-
er disciplines that seek to gain objective knowledge about the world, forensics 
historically arose with a specific purpose in mind, the investigation and prose-
cution of crimes).  
 22. See, e.g., Suzanne Bell, Forensic Chemistry, 2 ANN. REV. ANALYTICAL 
CHEMISTRY 297, 313 (2009) (arguing that although forensic chemists must 
“meet the requirements of both the scientific community . . . and the legal 
community,” scientific concerns that underlie the practice are paramount); 
Thomas R. May, Fire Pattern Analysis, Junk Science, Old Wives’ Tales, and 
Ipse Dixet: Emerging Forensic 3D Imaging Technologies to the Rescue, 16 
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2010) (stating that forensic fire-scene reconstruction 
is “based upon relevant scientific principles and research”); Ronald Nichols, 
The Scientific Foundations of Firearms and Tool Mark Identification—A Re-
sponse to Recent Challenges, CAL. ASS’N CRIMINALISTS NEWS, 2d Quarter 2006, 
at 9, available at http://firearmsid.com/Feature%20Articles/nichols060915/ 
AS%20Response%20110805.pdf (arguing that “Firearms and Tool Mark Identi-
fication is [r]ooted in [s]ound [s]cientific [f ]oundations”); Standard Terminolo-
gy of Friction Ridge Examination, SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP ON FRICTION 
RIDGE ANALYSIS, STUDY AND TECHNOLOGY, 1 (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www 
.swgfast.org/documents/terminology/110323_Standard-Terminology_3.0.pdf (de-
scribing the ACE-V fingerprinting identification method as “a scientific method”).  
 23. “Is the moon made of green cheese?” and “Is astrology valid?” are em-
pirical questions: they inquire as to something that can be established through 
observation, testing, and data gathering. See, e.g., 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra 
note 20, § 5:3 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Is the death penalty mor-
al?” and “Does God exist?” are not empirical questions: their answers are not 
“confined to the natural world.” See id. 
 24. See WILLIAM D. CRANO & MARILYNN B. BREWER, PRINCIPLES AND 
METHODS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 5 (2d ed. 2002) (“One of the most im-
portant . . . methods of hypothesis generation involves the logical deduction of 
expectations from some established theory . . . : Theory X implies that B will 
result from A. We hypothesize that if X is true, producing A will result in the 
occurrence of B.”); MARK MITCHELL & JANINA JOLLEY, RESEARCH DESIGN EX-
PLAINED 116 (1988) (“The simple experiment starts with an experimental  
hypothesis . . . .”).  
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and tests are then designed and performed to attempt to dis-
confirm, or falsify, the hypothesis.25 This attempt to falsify one’s 
hypotheses is traditional science’s end-goal.26 Theories that 
survive multiple, evolving attempts at falsification become ac-
cepted and relied upon when examining future questions be-
cause “a theory that that can withstand such scrutiny is one 
that deserves credence.”27 
Forensics practitioners, by contrast, are concerned with 
making comparisons.28 For example, forensics practitioners 
might make comparisons between two fingerprints, or between 
a shell casing and a firearm. Relying on assumptions about 
those items, forensics practitioners draw conclusions about 
those comparisons—for example, whether the two fingerprints 
originate from the same source, or whether the shell casing was 
fired from the firearm in question. This methodology departs 
from traditional science because the goal of forensics compari-
sons is not to falsify a theory about the probable match between 
two items, but to confirm the theory that the two items match.29  
Moreover, forensic methods lack falsifiability because 
many forensic practices rely on the subjective judgment of the 
examiner rather than objectively observable data.30 Although 
 
 25. See ERICA BEECHER-MONAS, EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 40–
44 (2007) (describing the relationship between empirical testing and falsifia-
bility); 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 5 (describing the scientific method).  
 26. See KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH 
OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (3d ed. 1969) (“[T]he criterion of the scientific 
status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.”).  
 27. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 5:5.  
 28. See 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 21, § 29:6 (“The forensic scientist 
undertakes to compare evidence found at the crime scene to evidence known to 
belong to a suspect.”).  
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 159 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(explaining that a firearm-and-toolmark expert “compares the height, depth, 
width, length and spatial relations of their striations. Significant similarity 
between striations signals an ‘identification’ or a ‘match’—that is, the bullets 
were fired from the same firearm” while not indicating that the expert looks 
for dissimilarities); WILLIAM J. BODZIAK, FOOTWEAR IMPRESSION EVIDENCE: 
DETECTION, RECOVERY, AND EXAMINATION 347 (2d ed. 2000) (“Positive identi-
fications may be made with as few as one random identifying characteris-
tic . . . .”); 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 21, § 29:40 (“Whenever a fingerprint 
analyst encounters a fingerprint with a dozen or so matching characteristics 
and one dissimilarity, he will invariably rationalize the dissimilarity some-
how, even if the rationalization is contrived.”).  
 30. See Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Science and Capital Punishment Re-
form: An “Intellectually Honest” Assessment, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 299, 
339 (2007) (“[T]he process [of forensic identification] is entirely subjective in 
that an examiner’s discriminatory ability (or inability) is based wholly on his 
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specific physical characteristics or constituent data about evi-
dence may be determined absent the examiner’s subjective 
judgment,31 she must apply her subjective judgment based on 
her experience as an examiner, rather than quantitative data, 
when determining whether the evidence supports a conclusion 
that two items match.32  
Forensic techniques also lack scientific validity. In tradi-
tional science, validity refers to a measure or test’s ability to 
measure what it purports to measure.33 Because forensics prac-
titioners’ conclusions rest heavily on experience and subjective 
judgment rather than objective experimentation it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to objectively determine if forensics practition-
ers’ conclusions are scientifically valid.34  
Recent independent studies confirm forensics’ scientific de-
ficiencies. Two recent congressionally funded reports by the 
National Research Council35 found that, with the exception of 
nuclear DNA analysis, “no forensic method has been rigorously 
shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high de-
gree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence 
and a specific individual or source.”36 These reports called for 
further study of the scientific reliability of various forensics 
 
experience and training.”); Michael J. Saks, Banishing Ipse Dixit: The Impact 
of Kumho Tire on Forensic Identification Science, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
879, 883 (2000) (“Forensic identification science examinations are overwhelm-
ingly subjective affairs.”).  
 31. For example, the number of “ridge-marks” or “whorls” on a fingerprint 
may be measured by a computer, as might the physical depth, frequency, and 
length of tool marks on a shell casing. 
 32. See, e.g., Bradford T. Ulery et al., Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic 
Latent Fingerprint Decisions, 108 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 7733, 7733 
(2011) (stating that fingerprint examiners “use[ ] their expertise rather than a 
quantitative standard to determine if the information content [from a set of 
prints] is sufficient to make a decision”).  
 33. See KELLY M. PYREK, FORENSIC SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: THE CHAL-
LENGES OF FORENSIC LABORATORIES AND THE MEDICO-LEGAL INVESTIGATION 
SYSTEM 241–45 (2007) (discussing the scientific method and its requirements 
of validity). 
 34. See id. at 245–75 (noting some difficulties of proving the validity of 
forensics practitioners’ conclusions). 
 35. BALLISTIC IMAGING, supra note 16; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra 
note 20.  
 36. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 7; see also BALLISTIC IM-
AGING, supra note 16, at 3 (“The validity of the fundamental assumptions of 
uniqueness and reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks has not yet been 
fully demonstrated.”); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 111–83 
(contrasting principles of scientific knowledge and the scientific method with 
those that underlie forensic techniques). 
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disciplines.37 One such study examined fingerprint analysis 
from a scientific perspective, subjecting fingerprint analysts to 
double-blind tests to gauge the accuracy of the process.38 The 
study concluded simultaneously that, although it is possible to 
establish systematic methods by which fingerprint analysis can 
be tested,39 the interpretation of data in fingerprint analysis 
“relies on the expertise of latent print examiner,”40 and that 
“[e]xaminers frequently differed on whether fingerprints were 
suitable for reaching a conclusion.”41 
In short, forensics fail to meet basic scientific principles of 
falsifiability and validity. This is significant, for it has the po-
tential to affect both a court’s admissibility decision, and the 
scope of the expert’s testimony once on the witness stand. 
B. THE STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY: DAUBERT AND KUMHO 
TIRE 
Case law governing the admissibility of expert testimony 
has evolved substantially over time. From 1922 to 1993, the 
admissibility of expert testimony in federal court was governed 
by Frye v. United States.42 In Frye, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals considered a criminal defendant’s challenge to the ad-
missibility of the results of his systolic blood pressure test, the 
technological precursor to the polygraph, which at the time was 
an incipient technology.43 Frye, the defendant, argued that his 
test results should be excluded because the theory on which the 
systolic test was based was not widely accepted by the legal or 
scientific community.44 The Court agreed, and in a two-page de-
cision that would later be adopted by nearly all federal and 
state jurisdictions,45 held that a field of science, the application 
 
 37. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 22 (recommending that 
“[t]he National Institute of Forensic Science should competitively fund peer-
reviewed research” for, among other things, “[s]tudies establishing the scien-
tific bases demonstrating the validity of forensic methods” and “[t]he develop-
ment and establishment of quantifiable measures of the reliability and accura-
cy of forensic analysis”).  
 38. See Ulery et al., supra note 32, at 7733.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
 43. Id. at 1013–14. 
 44. Id. at 1014. 
 45. See Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissi-
bility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5TH 
453 (2001) (discussing states’ and other federal circuits’ adoption of Frye).  
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of a particular field of science, or even a non-scientific tech-
nique was admissible only if the judge could find that such 
“general acceptance” by a meaningful segment of the relevant 
expert community existed.46  
In 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence.47 
Rule 702 governed expert testimony and allowed experts to tes-
tify to their opinions in court provided their opinions were pred-
icated on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” 
and supported by the expert’s “knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education.”48 
The Supreme Court was asked to evaluate Frye’s applica-
bility to scientific testimony under Rule 702 in Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.49 In Daubert, the plaintiff sub-
mitted in vitro studies of animals, reanalysis of existing 
studies, and pharmacological studies to establish that the drug 
Bendectin could cause birth defects.50 At the trial stage, the de-
fendants won summary judgment because, under Frye, the 
plaintiff ’s experts’ methods for arriving at their conclusion 
were not generally accepted.51 The Supreme Court reversed, 
and held that Frye’s “general acceptance” standard did not con-
trol courts’ admissibility determinations under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence; in so holding, the Court overruled Frye.52 
The Court explained that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
the trial judge’s function was one of “gatekeep[er]” for expert 
testimony.53 In making a gatekeeping admissibility determina-
tion, a trial judge’s ultimate inquiry is whether the proffered 
expert testimony is both relevant to the proceeding at hand and 
reliable.54 The Daubert Court was careful to distinguish be-
tween “evidentiary reliability” and “scientific reliability,” noting 
that “evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validi-
ty.”55 The Court enumerated five non-exhaustive factors to aid 
 
 46. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.  
 47. Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceed-
ings, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). 
 48. PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF 
EVIDENCE 93 (Supp. 1974).  
 49. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 50. Id. at 582–83. 
 51. Id. at 584. 
 52. Id. at 588 (“Nothing in the text [of Rule 702] establishes ‘general ac-
ceptance’ as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility.”).  
 53. Id. at 597.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 590 n.9. 
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trial judges in determining whether a particular scientific 
technique or theory is scientifically valid, and thus legally reli-
able.56 Critically, these factors require falsifiability (testing), 
and validity (known error rate, peer review, maintenance of 
standards, and general acceptance).  
Daubert addressed “scientific” knowledge under Rule 702, 
but was silent as to Rule 702’s other two prongs: “technical 
knowledge,” and “other specialized knowledge.”57 Following 
Daubert, federal courts and scholars disputed whether the 
Daubert factors applied outside the scientific context, and many 
courts restricted their application of the factors to testimony 
they deemed “science,” declining to apply the factors to non-
scientific “technical” or “specialized knowledge.”58 The Supreme 
Court clarified this issue in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.59 In 
Kumho Tire, the Court clarified that a court’s ultimate inquir-
ies—relevance and evidentiary reliability—were the same for 
all expert testimony under Rule 702, scientific or not.60 The 
Court wrote that there was “no relevant distinction” among the 
 
 56. The factors the Court enumerated were (1) whether the technique or 
theory at issue can be tested, id. at 593; (2) “whether the theory or technique 
has been subjected to peer review and publication,” id. at 593; (3) whether the 
technique or theory at issue has a known error rate, id. at 594; (4) whether 
“standards controlling the technique’s operation” exist, id.; and (5) whether 
the theory “ha[d] achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific com-
munity.” Id.  
 57. FED R. EVID. 702; see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., con-
curring) (characterizing the Daubert majority as focusing on “scientific 
knowledge” while remaining silent on the issues of “technical knowledge” and 
“other specialized knowledge”). 
 58. See, e.g., Sementilli v. Trinidad Corp., 155 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 
1998) (“[B]ecause [the proffered expert’s] declaration does not constitute ‘sci-
entific’ testimony, but rather testimony based on the doctor’s training and ex-
perience, the standards set out in [Daubert], governing admissibility of scien-
tific expert testimony, do not apply.”); Sorenson v. Robert B. Miller & Assocs., 
No. 95-5085, 1996 WL 515351, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1996) (concluding that 
the Daubert factors are unhelpful when applied to technical knowledge); Berry 
v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that the Daubert 
factors are of “limited help” in a case regarding the admissibility of police tes-
timony based solely on experience and not the scientific method); see also Lin-
da Sandstrom Simard & William G. Young, Daubert’s Gatekeeper: The Role of 
the District Judge in Admitting Expert Testimony, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1457, 1471 
(1994) (“Although the specific factors noted by the Daubert Court may indicate 
the reliability of scientific knowledge, however, they might not offer probative 
evidence of reliability for all types of expert testimony.”).  
 59. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  
 60. Id. at 149 (“We conclude that Daubert’s general principles apply to the 
expert matters described in Rule 702.”).  
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three prongs of Rule 702,61 and that therefore federal courts 
that grounded their admissibility decisions in such a distinction 
were incorrect.62 The Court wrote that a trial judge may assess 
evidentiary reliability using the Daubert factors provided the 
testimony is ultimately found to be relevant and reliable.63 The 
Court did not hold, however, that a trial judge must apply the 
Daubert factors to non-scientific testimony. Whether a court 
should use the Daubert factors in determining the admissibility 
of non-scientific expert testimony, the Kumho Tire Court wrote, 
“depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular 
case at issue,”64 and noted that some Daubert factors may or 
may not be relevant to a court’s admissibility decision in a giv-
en case.65 
Kumho Tire thus empowered district court judges with 
broad discretion in assessing reliability and relevance of expert 
testimony. As the next Part will show, however, that discretion 
sometimes led to admissibility decisions that were directly at 
odds with the principles outlined in Daubert, the case Kumho 
Tire purportedly clarified.  
II.  ADMISSIBILITY AND SCOPE OF TESTIMONY   
This Part addresses three distinct components of the post-
Kumho Tire landscape. Section A examines post-Kumho Tire 
courts’ various rationales for admitting forensics testimony. 
Section B examines the scope of forensics practitioners’ testi-
mony post-Kumho Tire and argues that once in the witness 
chair, forensics practitioners tend to overstate the capabilities 
of their fields and make assertions that are belied by their 
fields’ respective deficiencies regarding falsifiability and validi-
ty. Section C argues that, under existing Rule 702 precedent, 
forensics’ scientific deficiencies should affect the weight and 
scope of forensics practitioners’ testimony but should not bar 
forensics’ admissibility altogether.  
 
 61. Id. at 147.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 149.  
 64. Id. at 150.  
 65. Id. at 151 (“In certain cases, it will be appropriate . . . to ask, for ex-
ample, how often an . . . expert’s experience-based methodology has produced 
erroneous results, or whether such a method is generally accepted in the rele-
vant . . . community.”).  
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A. POST-KUMHO TIRE RATIONALES FOR ADMISSIBILITY 
Kumho Tire was a “wake-up call for defense counsel in 
criminal cases.”66 Prior to Kumho Tire, defense counsel tended 
to “assume[] that [forensics] experts could do what they 
claimed they did,” and not challenge forensic fields or tech-
niques.67 Kumho Tire, for the first time, “raised the issue of 
what bases all experts [not just scientists] have to support their 
testimony” and thus opened new doors for admissibility chal-
lenges on the basis of forensics’ reliability and validity.68 These 
defense attorneys reasoned that Kumho Tire gave them more 
“freedom to provide reliability factors [distinct from Daubert’s 
factors] to corroborate their expert’s testimony.”69 Despite a 
slew of challenges to forensics testimony on the basis of that 
testimony’s lack of scientific validity, post-Kumho Tire courts 
nonetheless tended to admit forensics testimony.70  
Some post-Kumho Tire courts justified their admission of 
forensics testimony by purportedly applying Daubert’s factors 
but stretching their meaning to the brink. For example, in 
United States v. Havvard,71 the district court characterized fin-
gerprint identification as “the very archetype of reliable expert 
testimony under [Daubert and Kumho Tire]”72 and found that 
the error rate of fingerprint examination was “vanishingly 
small”73 with no meaningful explanation as to how it arrived at 
that conclusion. As to Daubert’s testing requirement, the 
Havvard court reasoned that because fingerprinting had with-
stood a century of adversarial testing, it was reliable for 
Daubert purposes.74 The Havvard court misread Daubert en-
tirely: Daubert is unconcerned with testimony’s ability to with-
stand the crucible of litigation; it is concerned with whether ex-
 
 66. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 1:30.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Leslie Morsek, Get on Board for the Ride of Your Life! The Ups, the 
Downs, the Twists, and the Turns of the Applicability of the “Gatekeeper” Func-
tion to Scientific and Non-Scientific Expert Evidence: Kumho’s Expansion of 
Daubert, 34 AKRON L. REV. 689, 736 (2001).  
 70. See DeCoux, supra note 19, at 132 (“[P]rosecutors fending off chal-
lenges to the reliability of their expert witnesses enjoy a success rate of ninety-
two percent in trial courts and ninety-eight percent in appellate courts.”).  
 71. 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000).  
 72. Id. at 855.  
 73. Id. at 854.  
 74. Id. at 854–55.  
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pert testimony rises to the level of scientific reliability.75 To that 
end, Daubert’s testing requirement, which arose specifically in 
the scientific context, addressed scientific falsifiability, not 
cross-examination in a courtroom.76 The Havvard court misun-
derstood the principles upon which the Daubert Court based its 
rationale and consequently misapplied Daubert’s factors. 
Other post-Kumho Tire courts grappling with forensics tes-
timony took notice of Kumho Tire’s instruction that trial courts 
need not always consider the Daubert factors, provided that the 
proffered testimony is otherwise reliable and relevant. In Unit-
ed States v. Williams,77 the Second Circuit upheld the admis-
sion of a firearm-and-toolmark analyst’s testimony that shell 
casings found at the scene of a homicide matched those fired 
from the defendant’s gun. The court noted Kumho Tire’s clarifi-
cation that the specific Daubert factors are nonexhaustive and 
therefore chose to ignore them altogether as criteria to assess 
the testimony’s admissibility.78 The Court found the testimony 
reliable not because the method of firearm and toolmark identi-
fication relied on by the expert was scientifically valid, but be-
cause the particular expert in that case had extensive train-
ing.79 The implication, of course, is that in the Second Circuit, 
the testimony of a firearm-and-toolmark expert with twenty 
years’ experience is more reliable than an expert with ten 
years’ experience.80 This confirms the subjective nature of this 
type of testimony: an experienced examiner’s conclusions are 
more reliable than an inexperienced examiner’s conclusions on-
ly if the nature of the conclusion was essentially a subjective 
judgment. 
A third set of post-Kumho Tire courts combine the two ap-
proaches: relying on some Daubert factors, but not others. For 
 
 75. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993) 
(stating that “evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity”).  
 76. Id. at 593 (specifically linking the “testing” factor to falsifiability in a 
scientific sense).  
 77. 506 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2007).  
 78. Although the Williams court did take notice of the Daubert factors, id. 
at 160, it did not apply any of them to the firearm-and-toolmark examiner’s 
methodology, id. at 161–62.  
 79. Id. at 161 (“Daubert was satisfied here . . . [because of the expert’s] 
service as a firearms examiner for approximately twelve years; her receipt of 
‘hands-on training’ from her section supervisor . . . ; her experience examining 
approximately 2,800 different types of firearms; and her prior expert testimo-
ny on between twenty and thirty occasions.”).  
 80. Id. (“We do not wish this opinion to be taken as saying that any prof-
fered ballistic expert should be routinely admitted.”).  
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example, in United States v. Ford, the Third Circuit upheld a 
trial court’s admission of the prosecution’s shoeprint analyst’s 
testimony linking the defendant to the crime scene.81 The theo-
ry of footprint analysis is based on the assumption that each 
person’s footprint is potentially unique, due to the type of shoes 
worn, unique characteristics acquired as the shoes are worn, 
and how weight and gait affect the impression the shoe leaves 
on the ground.82 The examiner compares a shoeprint left in the 
ground to characteristics of a criminal suspect83 and deter-
mines, based on training and experience, whether the two 
match, or at minimum whether the suspect can be excluded as 
a match.84  
The Ford Court noted that the district court found that the 
examiner’s techniques were “general[ly] accept[ed] . . . subject 
to peer review . . . [and that] the potential error rate is 
known.”85 However, the court also noted in a footnote that the 
error rate for shoeprint analysis “has not been firmly estab-
lished,”86 and that, after Kumho Tire, “a strict application of the 
Daubert factors” to forensics testimony was probably a “fruit-
less exercise.”87 Put simply, Ford belies itself: it upholds shoe-
print testimony’s admission as reliable under Daubert while at 
the same time explaining why shoeprint testimony is unreliable 
according to scientific notions of falsifiability and validity.  
At least one court has grappled with forensics’ admissibil-
ity following the National Research Council studies which 
questioned forensics’ scientific reliability.88 In United States v. 
Love,89 the district court relied on the May 2011 Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences study90 when concluding that 
fingerprint analysis had an error rate of 0.01%. However, the 
Love court ignored crucial passages of the study that noted that 
 
 81. 481 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2007).  
 82. SUZANNE BELL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 324–25 (2008).  
 83. For example, if the examiner knows that the suspect weighs 250 
pounds, she may infer that the suspect’s shoeprint may be deeper in the 
ground than that of someone who weighs 150 pounds. See id. (“[E]ach person 
will generate unique [shoe impression patterns] based on their weight, gait, 
and how they use and wear the shoes.”). 
 84. Id.; see also id. at 218 (defining “individualization” of physical evi-
dence as the process of “linking” that evidence to a “common source”). 
 85. Ford, 481 F.3d at 218.  
 86. Id. at 218 n.4. 
 87. Id. at 218 n.5.  
 88. See supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text.  
 89. No. 10-CR-2418-MMM, 2011 WL 2173644 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2011).  
 90. Id. at *3 (citing Ulery et al., supra note 32, at 7733, 7735).  
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fingerprint analysis was fundamentally subjective91 and that 
“there is currently no objective basis for determining the suffi-
ciency of information necessary to reach a fingerprint examina-
tion decision.”92  
The forensic techniques at issue in Havvard, Williams, 
Ford, and Love “utterly fail to meet Daubert’s basic crite-
ria . . . [of] reliability beyond the ipse dixit of those who prac-
tice them.”93 The hypothesis that two people wearing identical 
shoes will produce distinct, unique prints has never been test-
ed;94 nor has the notion that all fingerprints are unique;95 nor 
has the proposition that firearm barrels leave unique marks on 
shell casings. Moreover, all three techniques require the subjec-
tive assessment of the examiner to determine that any similari-
ties between items are significant.96 Since subjective judgments 
cannot be objectively falsified,97 it is impossible to know the er-
ror rate of any of the techniques in these cases.98 None of these 
 
 91. Ulery et al., supra note 32 (“Latent print examiners compare latents 
to exemplars, using their expertise rather than a quantitative standard to de-
termine if the information content is sufficient to make a decision.”). 
 92. Ulery et al., supra note 32, at 7738.  
 93. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 1:30 n.4.  
 94. See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science 
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 72 (2009) (“No data 
supports [the] opinion” that “the effect of gait on the sole of a shoe is unique.”).  
 95. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 267 (4th Cir. 2003) (referring to 
a fingerprint expert who “was unable to reference any study establishing that 
no two persons share the same fingerprint; she was able only to testify that no 
study had ever proven this premise false”); see also 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra 
note 21, § 32:1 (“Many of the most basic claims of fingerprint identification 
have never been tested empirically, and the field’s most thoughtful research 
and scholarship have concluded that, in the strong form in which they are 
usually presented, those claims in fact are unprovable.”).  
 96. See Saks, supra note 30, at 883 (“Forensic . . . examinations are over-
whelmingly subjective affairs. . . . [T]he field requires [fingerprinting] experts 
to be doubly subjective: Not only must they reach a subjective judgment about 
the likelihood of a coincidental match, but they may not testify to an identifi-
cation unless they believe that every other fingerprint expert’s subjective judg-
ment would render the same conclusion. Thus, fingerprint examiners must 
draw subjective impressions about other people’s subjective impressions.”).  
 97. See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 5:2. 
 98. Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fin-
gerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1033 (2005) (“The 
existing data are inadequate to calculate a meaningful error rate for forensic 
fingerprint identification.”); Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Error Rates 
for Human Latent Fingerprint Examiners, in AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT 
RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 339, 339 (Nalini Ratha & Ruud Bolle eds., 2004) (“It is 
impossible to determine from existing data whether true error rates are 
miniscule or substantial.”); see also United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-00167 
WHA, 2007 WL 485967, at *8 (“The peer-reviewed literature and the three ex-
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techniques is scientifically valid, because all three methodolo-
gies suffer from confirmation bias:99 by looking primarily for 
similarities among fingerprints, shell casings, and shoeprints, 
the examiner selectively identifies information that confirms 
her theory while ignoring areas of dissimilarity. 
Ford, Havvard, Williams, and Love are only a few of many 
examples of federal courts’ admitting forensics testimony while 
disregarding Daubert’s command that legal reliability equates 
with scientific validity.100 After Kumho Tire, courts apparently 
concluded that they are no longer required to link scientific re-
liability to admissibility for any type of expert testimony.101 In 
cases where courts directly apply Daubert’s factors, as in 
Havvard, they misconstrue the meaning of those factors, 
stretching their meaning beyond what the Daubert court in-
tended.  
B. SCOPE OF TESTIMONY AT TRIAL, POST-KUMHO TIRE 
During trial, forensics practitioners often testify with con-
fidence about the accuracy of their fields. That is, even if courts 
take notice of forensics’ deficiencies with respect to the scientific 
method and scientific reliability, those courts rarely limit the 
scope of practitioners’ testimony because of those deficiencies.  
Many forensics practitioners make bold claims about their 
field’s accuracy and reliability. For example, more than one fin-
gerprinting analyst has testified before a jury that fingerprint 
identification has a negligible error rate (one percent or less) 
when the technique is applied properly by trained examiners; 
any error, they said, was a result of human misapplication of 
the methodology, not the methodology itself.102 As recently as 
June 2011, a fingerprint examiner testified in United States v. 
Love that “[e]rrors [in the fingerprinting process] occur, but 
 
perts who testified conceded that it is not possible to calculate an absolute er-
ror rate for firearms identification.”). 
 99. SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 
233 (1993) (defining “confirmation bias,” and giving examples).  
 100. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993).  
 101. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–48 (stating that, 
in the scientific context, evidentiary reliability meant scientific validity, but 
evidentiary reliability in other contexts might mean something else depending 
on the nature of the particular case).  
 102. United States v. Llera-Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Penn. 2002) 
(FBI fingerprint examiner testified that the error rate of fingerprinting gener-
ally was approximately one percent); Larkin v. Yates, CV 09-2034-DSF, 2009 
WL 2049991, at *16 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (fingerprint expert testified at trial that 
the error rate of the field was 0.08%).  
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those errors are human errors resulting from human imple-
mentation of the . . . process. Because human errors are non-
systematic . . . there is no overall predictive error rate in latent 
fingerprint analysis.”103 
These examples are not unique to fingerprint analysts. 
Most forensics examiners are trained to either testify with ab-
solute certainty or not at all. A firearm-and-toolmark examiner 
testified that, applying generally accepted principles of firearm 
and toolmark identification, “if two cartridge cases share the 
same magazine mark, then one could say with one hundred 
percent certainty that the two cartridge cases had been cycled 
through the same magazine.”104 Even a forensic shoe print ana-
lyst “offered a potential error rate of zero for the method, stat-
ing that any error is attributable to examiners.”105 
These statements about the purported error rate of forensic 
techniques strain credulity at best and are deceitful at worst. 
They completely upend the meaning of “error rate” as used in 
Daubert and in traditional science. When the Daubert Court 
spoke of “error rate,” it referred to the scientific validity of 
measurements:106 the way we know how often a technique 
measures what it purports to measure is because we know how 
often the technique does not measure what it purports to meas-
ure. Scientific validity can only be established through objective 
testing and an application of the scientific method.107 Scientific 
validity cannot be established through the basis of most foren-
sic conclusions: the subjective opinion of the practitioner.108  
Still other forensics practitioners go further, testifying to 
their level of certainty in particular cases. For example, one 
firearm-and-toolmark examiner concluded with “100% certain-
ty” that specific shell casings found at a crime scene matched 
the defendant’s gun.109 While testifying to a level of certainty 
was historically endorsed by some medical authorities, some 
organizations have subsequently prohibited experts to make 
such sweeping claims.110  
 
 103. United States v. Love, No. 10CR2418-MMM, 2011 WL 2173644 at *5 
(S.D. Cal., June 1, 2011).  
 104. Sexton v. State, 93 S.W.3d 96, 98–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).  
 105. United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2006).  
 106. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).  
 107. See PYREK, supra note 33, at 245–75. 
 108. Cooley, supra note 30, at 343 (“[D]ata for the individualizing forensic 
sciences are non-existent and nearly impossible to calculate.”). 
 109. United States v. McCaleb, 302 Fed. App’x 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 110. Compare Burke v. Town of Walpole, 405 F.3d 66, 90 n.30 (1st Cir. 
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This type of bold certitude renders such testimony decided-
ly un-scientific. Science’s lexicon is that of uncertainty, not cer-
tainty.111 Indeed, “[w]ithout skepticism there can be no science, 
because uncertainty promotes growth.”112 The very nature of 
traditional science dictates that as more and better data be-
comes available, previous assumptions about a state of affairs 
is called into doubt, replaced by new and better established hy-
potheses.113 
And yet some forensics practitioners continue to simulta-
neously claim both certainty in their conclusions and scientific 
basis in their methods. This dissonance may be explained by 
the forensics examiner’s continuing role as a state agent, testi-
fying on behalf of the prosecution. “Error is a concept that 
causes a good deal of consternation in the minds of forensic sci-
entists” due to “a widespread belief” that identifying errors in 
past testimony “will be used to discredit them in court” in the 
future or even “compromise their entire career.”114 Understand-
ably then, these practitioners have an incentive to make “bold 
absolute[]”115 findings in their fields of expertise to bolster their 
expert reputations. Uncertainty is “antithetical to prosecutorial 
criminal law;”116 consequently, the more doubt a practitioner 
expresses about the error rate of his field generally or his con-
 
2005) (citing AM. BD. OF FORENSIC ODONTOLOGISTS, Bite-Mark Terminology 
Guidelines (1995) (arguing that the ABFO’s guidelines conflate “several argu-
ably distinct levels of certainty,” even equating “reasonable degree of medical 
certainty” with “virtual certainty”)), with AM. BD. OF FORENSIC ODONTOLOGY, 
Policies, Procedures, Guidelines, & Standards, in DIPLOMATES REFERENCE 
MANUAL 57, 77, 114–18 (2012) (reasonable medical certainty is defined as 
“beyond reasonable doubt,” and that bitemark “[t]erms assuring unconditional 
identification of a perpetrator, or without doubt, are not sanctioned as a final 
conclusion”).  
 111. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (“It 
would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony 
must be ‘known’ to a certainty . . . there are no certainties in science.”). 
 112. Cooley, supra note 30, at 362.  
 113. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 259–61; see also Julie E. Blend, 
Using Expert Witnesses in Employment Litigation, 17 REV. LITIG. 27, 36 (1998) 
(“[S]cientists can and do distinguish between ‘good science’ and ‘bad science.’ 
They go about this principally by assessing the extent to which the theory or 
technique has survived the rigors of testing and replication by other scientists.”).  
 114. See John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, The General Assumptions 
and Rationale of Forensic Identification, in 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 21, 
at 1, 29.  
 115. BALLISTIC IMAGING, supra note 16, at 67.  
 116. Cooley, supra note 30, at 365. 
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clusions in a specific case, the less likely it becomes that prose-
cutors will rely on him in future cases.117  
C. THE COURTS’ CONUNDRUM: EXCLUSION VS. SCOPE OF 
TESTIMONY 
In light of forensics’ demonstrated failure to meet scientific 
standards of validity, reliability, and falsifiability, courts con-
sidering forensics evidence face a conundrum: whether the evi-
dence’s scientific deficiencies render it so unreliable as to war-
rant exclusion from courtrooms. Under Kumho Tire, that 
forensic techniques fail to meet traditional scientific standards 
does not bar their admissibility. However, forensics’ deficien-
cies should affect a court’s determination about whether to lim-
it the scope of a forensics practitioner’s testimony once on the 
witness stand.  
Many scholars have addressed forensics’ scientific deficien-
cies.118 These scholars tend to argue that forensic techniques 
should be excluded to the extent they fail to satisfy traditional 
notions of scientific validity, falsifiability and reliability.119 For 
example, Prof. Adina Schwartz, a longtime critic of firearm and 
toolmark testimony, argues that “because of . . . systemic scien-
tific problems, firearms and toolmark identification testimony 
should be inadmissible across-the-board.”120 Prof. Simon Cole, 
in a review of fingerprinting cases, noted that “fingerprint iden-
tification might be inadmissible under . . . Daubert/Kumho” be-
cause of scientific deficiencies in the technique.121 Professor Da-
vid Faigman, reacting to a case in which a district court 
 
 117. See, e.g., BALLISTIC IMAGING, supra note 16, at 67 (“If a firearms ex-
aminer is impeached . . . his or her ability to testify in other cases can be se-
verely affected; being associated with an error or misidentification can tarnish 
reputations.”). 
 118. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admis-
sibility Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1189 (2004); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of 
Fingerprint ‘Science’ is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2002); Garrett & 
Neufeld, supra note 94; Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliabil-
ity and Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 1 (2005). These, of course, represent only a small sample of 
the vast scholarship documenting forensic techniques’ failures to satisfy sci-
ence’s requirements.  
 119. See, e.g., David L. Faigman et al., A Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrim-
ination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1390 (2008) 
(“[A] necessary precondition for admissibility is basic [scientific] validity.”).  
 120. Schwartz, supra note 118, at 3.  
 121. Cole, supra note 118, at 1246 n.247.  
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excluded fingerprint evidence122 (a ruling on which the court 
quickly reversed itself)123 said “[t]here are a lot of emperors out 
there testifying who have no clothes. Where’s the science be-
hind it? Where’s the data?”124 
Although these scholars are correct in their diagnosis of 
the disease (forensics, as has been shown here and elsewhere 
fail to meet scientific standards of reliability and validity), their 
prescribed course of treatment (drawing a nexus between ad-
missibility and traditional science) is misguided. Non-scientific 
expert testimony is generally admissible in federal courts. 
Kumho Tire specifically ruled that distinctions among “scien-
tific,” “technical,” and “specialized knowledge” under Rule 702 
are immaterial to courts’ admissibility determination.125 Fur-
ther, the Kumho Tire Court found that the specific factors in 
Daubert—which evaluate the evidentiary reliability, falsifiabil-
ity, and scientific validity—may be inapplicable in some cases 
where experience, and not traditional science, was the principal 
basis of the expert’s opinion.126 Indeed, Kumho Tire held that 
the Daubert factors were “meant to be helpful, not definitive” 
and all may not be inapplicable altogether.127 Consequently, a 
technique need not be science qua science to be admissible un-
der Rule 702, and that forensics fail to meet traditional sci-
ence’s rigors cannot bar their admissibility.  
For example, under Kumho Tire, police officers are permit-
ted to testify on the basis of experience alone as to the meaning 
of “street terminology” if such a translation will aid a jury in 
understanding the lexicon of the illicit drug trade.128 Similarly, 
 
 122. United States v. Llera Plaza, Nos. CR 98-362-10, CR 98-362-11, CR 
98-362-12, 2002 WL 27305, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002) (Plaza I). 
 123. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
(Plaza II) (vacating Plaza I, which was withdrawn from the Federal Supple-
ment).  
 124. Cole, supra note 118, at 1246 n.250 (citing Joann Loviglio, Reliability 
of Fingerprint Evidence on Trial in Philadelphia, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 24, 
2002).  
 125. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–49 (1999).  
 126. Id. at 141 (arguing that the Daubert factors “neither necessarily nor 
exclusively apply to all experts or in every case”).  
 127. Id. at 151.  
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 276 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(reasoning that the Daubert factors were inapplicable and that “because the 
primary purpose of coded drug language is to conceal the meaning of the con-
versation from outsiders through deliberate obscurity, drug traffickers’ jargon 
is a specialized body of knowledge and thus an appropriate subject for expert 
testimony” (citing United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 211 (3d Cir. 1999)).  
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engineers are permitted to testify on the basis of their training 
and experience, not the scientific method, that a product was 
built to industry standards.129 Like forensics practitioners, the 
police officer and the engineer apply their subjective judgment 
to objective data they gathered working in their respective 
fields.  
Indeed, on one level, the only meaningful difference be-
tween forensics practitioners and other experience-based ex-
perts is the level of certainty that they express. The police of-
ficer does not testify “with 100% certainty” that his 
interpretation of the drug lexicon is accurate,130 nor does the 
engineer testify that his opinion as to product safety “has zero 
error rate” when it does not.131 To the contrary, they testify as 
to the details of their relative experiences in their fields, ex-
plain their methodology dispassionately, and explain their con-
clusions.132 Forensics practitioners, by contrast, tend to make 
broad pronouncements regarding the high degree of accuracy 
and objectivity of their field and techniques without scientific 
basis for such claims.133  
Thus, although forensic techniques’ deficiencies cannot bar 
their admissibility, these methods’ fallibilities are reason to 
limit the scope of forensics practitioners’ testimony once it is 
admitted to prevent practitioners from making unfounded 
claims about their fields’ capacity for certainty. The scope of an 
expert witness’s testimony is significant, principally because 
jurors tend to defer to experts, and an expert testifying in bold, 
 
 129. White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1006–09 (9th Cir. 2002) (not-
ing that engineers are permitted to testify on the basis of experience in the 
field following Kumho Tire).  
 130. See STEVEN D. STEWART, CLARK CNTY. PROSECUTING ATT’Y, EFFEC-
TIVE COURTROOM PERFORMANCE FOR INDIANA LAW ENFORCEMENT (2011), 
available at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/victim/ptips.pdf (Jan. 11, 2011) 
(advising that police officers be honest: “Do not guess or make up an answer. If 
you do not know the answer it is best to say, ‘I don’t know.’ If you are asked 
about details that you do not remember it is best to say, ‘I don’t remember’”).  
 131. See Brief of The National Academy of Engineering as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Kumho Tire Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) 
(No. 97-1709), 1998 WL 541971 (arguing that “[b]ecause engineers frequently 
rely on calculations and testing, ‘the known or potential rate of error’ of a 
technique for evaluating failure bears directly on that technique’s validity with-
in the engineering discipline,” but not claiming a particular level of accuracy).  
 132. See, e.g., STEWART, supra note 130 (“Answer all questions directly. 
Answer only the questions asked, then stop.”).  
 133. See BALLISTIC IMAGING, supra note 16, at 67 (noting that forensics 
practitioners often make “bold absolute” claims); supra notes 102–10 and ac-
companying text. 
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conclusory fashion that his technique is ninety-nine percent ac-
curate will undoubtedly have prejudicial effects on the jury.134 
Mere deference to the adversarial process will not prevent a 
practitioner from making unfounded claims in court. A cross-
examination of a forensics expert as to the falsifiability of his 
methodology or the known error rate of his field will inevitably 
descend into a debate between the attorney and the witness on 
the finer points of statistics, the meaning of scientific validity, 
base-rate data, or other technicalities whose discussion dis-
tracts the jury from its purpose. Indeed, these are the very is-
sues that, under Daubert and Kumho Tire, the judge is sup-
posed to determine. Deference to the adversarial process on the 
scope of testimony, therefore, runs counter to the very “judge-
as-gatekeeper” principle that Daubert and Kumho Tire have 
endorsed.  
In short, although the deficiencies of forensics from a scien-
tific perspective should matter to courts, under Kumho Tire, 
the field’s insufficiency as a scientific discipline may affect the 
scope of a practitioner’s testimony, not its admissibility. 
III.  DAUBERT RISES: LIMITING THE SCOPE OF 
FORENSICS TESTIMONY   
The notion that the remedy to concerns surrounding the 
evidentiary reliability of forensics lies in limiting the practi-
tioner’s sworn speech is not new or unique—several district 
courts have limited the scope of firearm-and-toolmark witness-
es to varying degrees.135 However, these courts grounded their 
 
 134. See, e.g., Jeffrey Heinrick, Everyone’s an Expert: The CSI Effect’s Neg-
ative Impact on Juries, TRIPLE HELIX, Fall 2006, at 60; Neil Vidmar, Expert 
Evidence, the Adversary System, and the Jury, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH SUP-
PLEMENT S137, S138 (2005) (“Among cases that eventually went to trial, phy-
sician ratings of whether negligence had occurred were positively related to 
jury verdicts at a statistically significant level.”). 
 135. See, e.g., United States v. Willock, 696 F. Supp. 2d 536(D. Md. 2009). 
In Willock, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation 
limiting a firearm-and-toolmark examiner’s testimony so that the examiner 
could not “opine that it is a ‘practical impossibility’ for any other firearm to 
have fired the cartridges other than the common ‘unknown firearm’ to which 
[the examiner] attributes the cartridges.” Id. at 574. See also, e.g., United 
States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (permitting 
firearm-and-toolmark examiner to testify only that a bullet “more likely than 
not” came from the suspect’s gun, and not to his degree of certainty); United 
States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 355 (D. Mass 2006) (allowing firearms 
expert to testify that a bullet came from a suspect’s gun “to a reasonable de-
gree of certainty” and prohibiting the witness from framing his conclusion in 
terms of ”an exact statistical certainty”). 
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limitations as to scope of testimony on case-specific factors. In 
cases involving forensics—where proffered evidence is unrelia-
ble but not so unreliable as to merit wholesale exclusion—
courts do not seem to have agreed-upon a methodology for how, 
or to what extent, a forensics practitioner’s testimony should be 
limited. This Part proposes such a methodology: given the need 
to limit the scope of forensics experts to mitigate the effects of 
conclusory or absolutist testimony, the Daubert factors are the 
solution.  
Following their initial admissibility determination under 
Daubert and Kumho Tire, courts should reapply the Daubert 
factors to the proposed testimony, using the factors as rough 
boundaries of the testimony’s scope. To the extent that a practi-
tioner satisfies a particular Daubert factor, she may testify to 
conclusions or opinions that fall materially under that factor. 
To the extent a witness fails to satisfy a factor, she may not tes-
tify to conclusions or opinions that fall materially under that 
factor. This is not to say, however, that forensics practitioners 
should not be permitted to testify to objective data points they 
observed—training and experience alone is a sufficient reliabil-
ity factor for these types of identifications.136  
The reapplication of Daubert to the scope of forensics prac-
titioners’ testimony would produce results both faithful to 
Daubert and Kumho Tire and mindful of the myriad issues of 
falsifiability and scientific validity the forensics field engen-
ders. To demonstrate how, consider the following hypothetical. 
A firearm-and-toolmark examiner testifies in limine that (1) 
she found “agreement” based on twelve matching class charac-
teristics and five matching individual characteristics between 
shell casings at a crime scene and a defendant’s firearm; (2) the 
field of firearm-and-toolmark analysis is ninety-eight percent 
accurate based on her department’s internal assessments; and 
(3) in this case, she is “virtually certain” that her conclusion is 
accurate. Under Kumho Tire, the first piece of testimony, that 
there are matching class and individual characteristics, is read-
ily admissible—this is not opinion, but observable data. Even 
her conclusion that there is “agreement” between the casings is 
admissible under Kumho Tire—this is a conclusion based on 
training and experience, much like the police officer’s testifying 
 
 136. Rule 702 expressly authorizes expert testimony on the basis of experi-
ence and training, but it, like the Supreme Court case law interpreting it, is 
silent on the issue of scope of testimony. 
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to the unique vocabulary of illicit narcotics trafficking.137 How-
ever, her testimony that her field is ninety-eight percent accu-
rate is an empirical (that is, scientific) claim; one which is not 
scientifically valid. There is no way to know whether the meth-
odology of firearm-and-toolmark analysis measures what it 
purports to measure ninety-eight percent of the time, because 
the field’s conclusions are made entirely on the basis of subjec-
tive opinions of the various participants in it.138 Thus, she may 
not testify to her error rate under Daubert’s “known error rate” 
factor, as her error rate is her opinion, and not “known.” Simi-
larly, because her conclusion that she is “virtually certain” that 
the two shell casings match is based on her opinion, not falsifi-
able tests, she may not testify to her level of certainty under 
Daubert’s “testing” prong.139 Using Daubert as a metric on the 
scope-of-testimony inquiry, she would be able to testify as to 
her opinion, but not to its degree of scientific certainty. Her 
conclusions would be presented as what they are, the opinion of 
a practitioner—and not a scientific conclusion. Under this 
framework, the practitioner would be a vehicle for observable 
data, not a generator of conjecture passing itself off as science.  
Some might believe that the distinction this solution de-
pends upon—scope of testimony versus admissibility—is one 
without a difference. They might argue that admissibility is the 
ultimate question, and that the reasons a forensics practition-
er’s testimony is reliable for admissibility purposes is the same 
reason it is reliable for scope of testimony purposes, and there-
fore the former should inform the scope of the latter. The dif-
ference, however, is in the Daubert opinion itself. The Daubert 
Court cautioned that “[t]he focus [of the trial judge’s admissi-
bility decision] must be solely on principles and methodology, 
not on the conclusions that they generate.”140 Thus, although 
the Daubert Court cautioned against too-heavy a focus on con-
 
 137. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 276 (4th Cir. 2007) (a 
police officer may testify on the basis of training and experience as to the 
meaning of certain words unique to the illegal drug trade).  
 138. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-00167 WHA, 2007 WL 
485967 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007) (describing that the firearm examiner con-
ceded that the error rate of the technique is not known in the scientific sense 
and erroneously reasoned that the falsifiability prong Daubert is satisfied de-
spite “[t]he few critiques—such as the impossibility of calculating a true error 
rate and the fact that there can be no statistical, objective verification of an 
examiner’s conclusions”). 
 139. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).  
 140. Id. at 595.  
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clusions at the admissibility stage, it was silent as to the scope 
of testimony.  
This Note does not purport to suggest the myriad ways 
that courts might adopt this solution in particular cases. It 
does, however, argue that the re-application of Daubert when 
determining the scope of forensics expert’s testimony is a prin-
cipled way under Kumho Tire of balancing information that 
would be helpful to the jury against the need to exclude testi-
mony that vastly overstates the capabilities of both forensics 
and individual examiners in light of those fields’ documented 
deficiencies with respect to falsifiability and scientific validity.  
  CONCLUSION   
The myriad disciplines within the field of forensics attempt 
to pass themselves off as science. Those within the those disci-
plines may make empirical claims, but apply subjective judg-
ments, selective data, and a bias towards the state in criminal 
cases when making those claims. However, under Kumho Tire, 
this alone cannot be a wholesale bar to this testimony’s admis-
sibility. The solution is to limit the scope of the expert’s testi-
mony once admitted using the Daubert reliability factors as 
guideposts. Doing so will lead to juries presented with infor-
mation not riddled with “bold absolute” testimony from practi-
tioners with no scientific basis to make the claims they do.  
